Historický ústav akademie věd České republiky, v. v. i.

ročník 99
č. 1–2



Miroslav ŠEDIVÝ
Legenda o Mnichovu Hradišti. Příspěvek k Metternichově balkánské a africké politice
[The Münchengrätz Legend. A Contribution to Metternich’s Balkan and African Policy]

s. 1–14

The Eastern Question formed an important item on the agenda of the Viennese chancellery in the early 1830s and its leader, Prince Metternich, paid considerable attention to the situation within the Ottoman Empire and its relations with European countries, in particular Russia. After Tsar Nicholas I modified his hostile policy towards his weak southern neighbor in September 1829 when he decided to support its existence, Russia no longer represented a threat to the sultan’s state. Metternich displayed remarkable analytical skills when he immediately came to the conclusion that the tsar had adopted a considerably pro-Ottoman attitude because it suited Russian interests and, from that moment, Austria had no reason to fear Russia’s policy in the Near East. This fact contributed to a quick rapprochement between the two conservative powers, a process that already was in progress before the outbreak of the July Revolution in France in 1830. In the early 1830s, Russia and Austria were united with mutual interests in Europe as well as in the Near East and, therefore, the two Great Powers could easily cooperate in both areas. As for the latter, this claim was proved by their identical policies during the so-called First Mohammed Crisis in 1831–1833 and, in particular, during Metternich’s meeting with Nicholas I in the North Bohemian town Münchengrätz in September 1833 where, contrary to the deep-rooted legend, Metternich did not accede to Nicholas I’s interests in the East in return for his support against the revolutions in the West simply for the fact that Metternich had not to do so since both countries’ interests in the East and West were identical. In brief, the well-known meeting in Münchengrätz was not such an important turning point in the Austrian-Russian relations as generally claimed, but simply the climax of the already existing good relationship between the two conservative powers.
Key words: History, Metternich, Münchengrätz, Austria, Russia, Ottoman Empire, Balkans, Egypt, North Africa, Eastern Question, Nationalism

Zapadlá cesta za polskou revolucí
[The Obscure Path to Polish Revolution]
s. 15–52

The Polish January Uprising of 1863 represented one of the most significant events of Polish national sentiment and the Polish historical tradition. Although it did not introduce any fundamental turnaround into the Czech national movement, nevertheless it did perceptibly affect it, and for some specific personalities it represented a significant impulse for the formulation of their conceptions about the struggle of the Czech milieu for its identity. One of the most active Czech intellectuals who positively reflected upon the Polish January Uprising who also helped some of its participants was the Czech writer Jan Neruda. Neruda’s participation in supporting the January Uprising was one of the greatest highlights of his active political contribution for the national movement of Czech democrats. His championing of the Polish Revolution and attempt at an inviolate preservation of its ideals can be considered as one of the most constructive ideological approaches taken up by the Czech democratic movement. In Neruda’s position as an engaged democratic writer for the Polish revolution we meet with a heretofore unknown illustration of culture developing ahead of politics. This is one of the most dynamic specifics of generations of Czech democratism.
Key words: History, Poland, 19th century, Czech Polonophilia, Czech Slavic Studies, Czech Polish Studies, Polish January Uprising 1863–1864, Jan Neruda

Politická a novinářská činnost Františka Síse (1914–1919)
[Political and Journalistic Activities of František Sís (1914–1919)]
s. 53–76

Since 1930s, the Prague valley of Divoká Šárka has been assuming the role of lieux de mémoires for the Czechs through the memorial plaque affixed to a rock and dedicated to the memory of K. Kramář, A. Rašín and, in particular, to the half-forgotten figure of Frantíšek Sís. The current study aims to explore F. Sís’ political and journalistic activities during 1914–1919 with particular reference to his intellectual commitment to the journal Národ. The study likewise assesses his reflections on the postwar development of the newly-established Czechoslovak state.
The Czech journalist F. Sís was the closest collaborator of K. Kramář and A. Rašín at the beginning of the 20th century. During the First World War he was among the founders of the Czech anti-Habsburg organization Maffie that initiated secret communication with the Allies through Bulgaria, Switzerland, and Italy and closely cooperated with F. Sís` younger brother Vladimir Sís.
One might characterize the political atmosphere in the Czech lands during 1915–1916 as one of bitter polemics between František Sís and Zdeněk Tobolka. The following split of the Young Czech party served as catalyst for the establishment of politico-intellectual circle and journal Národ, intended to act as a mighty “intellectual weapon” against the “activist” politicians and the Habsburg government. In this respect František Sís received support from some Czech politicians and intellectuals (P. Šámal, Em. Rádl, V. Dyk, K. Hoch, M. Sísová). He appealed to the Czech intelligentsia to actively participate in the Czech political life and bitterly criticized the Czech politicians for their loyalty to the Habsburgs. The release of K. Kramář and A. Rašín in 1917 further strengthened the position of František Sís within the Young Czech party.
The other main purpose of journal Národ was to lay the foundations of a new political party, striving for independent Czechoslovakia. In February 1918 the Czech Constitutional Law party was established, whose program was elaborated by F. Sís. During the late 1917 and throughout 1918 he closely cooperated with Polish and Southern Slav politicians and intellectuals, using public events. F. Sís used these events to reveal himself as a zealous supporter of the Slav solidarity concept as well as to demonstrate his qualities of an eloquent speaker.
In the eve of the October coup d`état (October 27-28, 1918), F. Sís was involved in establishing the so-called “military Maffie“ and prevented from taking the archive of Prague police away from the city. After the declaration of the Czechoslovak independence he participated in elaborating the legislature of the newly established Czechoslovak state.
F. Sís was also the author of the political program of the Czechoslovak National Democratic Party. In the program he developed his political ideology, based on the main principles of liberalism – democracy, progress, national tolerance, freedom of speech, etc.
During the interwar period, however, F. Sís’ image of a liberal thinker was gradually being transformed into one of a radical nationalist.
Key words: History, First World War, Young Czechs, Maffie, František Sís, Vladimír Sís, Karel Kramář, Alois Rašín, Národ circle, Czech Constitutional Law Democracy, Slav solidarity

István JANEK
Sovětská diplomacie o vytváření slovensko-maďarských vztahů v letech 1939–1940
[Soviet Policy on the Creation of Slovak-Hungarian Relations in the Years 1939–1940]
s. 79–99

As a result of the German advance in the years 1938–1939 the state formation of Czecho-Slovakia collapsed. The Germans created the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia from the Czech part, and on 14. March 1939 Slovakia declared its independence. After concluding the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviet Union unexpectedly became an ally of the Slovak policy. Slovak political decision-makers evaluated this act as a “historic turnaround”, which then enabled the realization of mutual solidarity between Germany and Russia. Soviet diplomats by contrast with their Western colleagues characterized Slovakia in their reports as a “gate facing the Balkans” and as an “eye” into the Western half of Europe, and therefore they considered it important that Moscow, by means of their reports, should understand the events that were taking place there. Jozef Tiso assessed cooperation as a crucial even from the point of view of both nations’ future. Slovak politicians saw in their relationship with the Soviet Union the possibility to seek a counterbalance against the German influence that was encumbering the country. Additionally, je judged that unlike Hungary, the Slovaks would be able to count on support from Moscow.
In the fall of 1939 full diplomatic relations between Hungary and the Soviet Union were renewed, in which the German-Soviet rapprochement also played a role. The opening a Soviet embassy in Budapest also had an influence on the Slovak-Hungarian relationship. The Slovak delegate in Budapest judged that they spoke with him at the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a different tone starting from that period. It was his impression that the Hungarians evaluated Slovakia as a Slavic country which was also being supported by the Soviet Union. Soviet diplomats attempted to keep their government informed in as much detail as possible about the Slovak-Hungarian relationship.
Key words: History, Diplomacy, Hungarian-Russian-Slovakian relations, 1939–1941

Rusko, Turecko a Írán v náhorně-karabašské válce (1992–1994)
[Russia, Turkey and Iran in the Nagorno-Karabakh War (1992–1994)]
s. 101–118

This article seeks to explore the roles played by the three regional powers, namely Russia, Turkey, and Iran in the armed phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that raged from the last years of the Soviet Union until 1994, when a ceasefire between the belligerents, Armenia and Azerbaijan, brokered by Russia, was achieved. The article details the relations of each participant regional power with both Armenia and Azerbaijan that was conducive to their stance toward the Karabakh war, and concludes that the outcome was influenced by the way(s) in which Armenia and Azerbaijan were perceived by these powers. In so doing, the study illustrates that the regional powers' policies toward the ongoing war was an indicator of their foreign political activism in the years that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union, when a new understanding of this complicated region was being shaped in participant countries. It illustrated, inter alia, that Russia was still to play a decisive role in the region of the South Caucasus owing to its strong military, economic, and political presence in its former domain, and given Moscow's alliance with Yerevan on the one hand, and Moscow's deteriorating relations with Azerbaijan the elites of which rejected Russia's participation in the country's promising oil industry and the installation of Russian military on its soil. The article also demonstrated the pillars of Iran's policies toward the conflict centered on Tehran's fear of a Baku-supported irredentist movement in the country's northwest, which is populated by a demographically strong Azerbaijani minority. For Turkey, Azerbaijan played a role as a key South Caucasian country with a Turcophone majority, rich oil and natural gas resources, and access to Central Asia. Given these factors, Ankara's conflict with Yerevan over the recognition of the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire (1915–1916) and Baku's pressure on Ankara to cut off any contacts with the Armenian state shaped Turkey's preference of Azerbaijan, drawing a dividing line between Turkey's pro-Azerbaijani and Iran's and Russia's more pro-Armenian approach in the Karabakh conflict.
Key words: History, Russia, Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Armed Conflict, War, South Caucasus


Bulharský stát ve středověku
State and Church: Studies in Medieval Bulgaria and Byzantium. Edited by Vassil Gjuzelev and Kiril Petkov
Vlast i istorija v srednovekovna Bălgarija, VII –XIV vek
Samostojatelni i polusamostojatelni vladenija văv văzobnovenoto Bălgarsko carstvo (kraja na XII – sredata na XIII v.)
(Lubomíra Havlíková)
s. 119–122

Stredoveký Balkán. Kapitoly z politických, sociálnych a hos¬po¬dárskych dejín
juhovýchodnej Európy v 6.–15. storočí
(Lubomíra Havlíková)
s. 122–125

Legenda o hraběti Zrinském ve slovenské a chorvatské kultuře
Legenda o grófovi Zrínskom I. Súvislosti
Legenda o grófovi Zrínskom II. Chrestomatia
(František Šístek)
s. 126–129

Dvě nové monografie k ruským dějinám dějepisectví
Professor V. I. Ger’je i jego učeniki
Aleksej V. MALINOV – Sergej N. POGODIN
Vladimir Ivanovič Ger’je
(Josef Šaur)
s. 130–132

Niemiecko-austriackie rodziny urzędnicze w Galicji 1772−1918
(Petr Kaleta)
s. 132–136

Maďarská historiografie k Benešovi
(Eva Irmanová)
s. 136–140

John Doyle KLIER
Russian, Jews, and the Pogroms of 1881–1882
(Zbyněk Vydřa)
s. 141–144

Jiří FRIEDL (ed,)
Státní politika vůči polské menšině na Těšínsku v letech 1945–1949. Výběrová edice dokumentů
(Pavol Jakubec)
s. 145–150

Ruská akce pod drobnohledem
Lukáš BABKA – Igor ZOLOTAREV (sostaviteli)
Russkaja akcija pomošči v Čechoslovakii. Istorija, značenije, nasledije
(Alexander Brummer)
s. 151–153


Mečislav BORÁK
Profesor Tadeusz Kisielewski (1939–2012)
[Professor Tadeusz Kisielewski (1939–2012)]
s. 162–164

Status quo Jozef Jablonický (3. január 1933 – 7. december 2012)
[Status quo Jozef Jablonický (3. January 1933 – 7. December 2012)]
s. 165–178

František ŠÍSTEK
Desnicova setkání 2012: jihoslovanští intelektuálové a válka (1939–1947)
[Desnica Conference 2012: South-Slavic Intellectuals and the War (1939–1947)]
s. 179–182

Konference T. G. Masaryk v roce 2012
[Conference T. G. Masaryk in the Year 2012]
s. 182–183

Mezinárodní vědecká konference T. G. Masaryk a Slované
[International Scholarly Conference T. G. Masaryk and the Slavs]
s. 183–185

Výstava o Františku Václavu Marešovi
[Exhibition on František Václav Mareš]
s. 185–186


Dalibor VÁCHA
Českoslovenští dobrovolci na cestě z Ruska do Francie. Severní cestou na západní frontu – sonda do válečné každodennosti
[Czechoslovak Volunteers on the Journey from Russia to France. Taking the Northern Route to the Western Front: a Probe into Everyday Life in Wartime]
s. 187–215

The year 1917 represented for the Czechoslovak resistance movement in Russia a turning point, chiefly owing to the two Russian revolutions of that year. There was much just cause for serious consideration of a transfer of some of the soldiers and captives to France, for it would have been thus possible to create a cadre for the Czechoslovak units there within the framework of the French Army. This ambitious plan, however, was not fulfilled, and its only result was two transports with several hundred soldiers. The transports were made up of soldiers and officers from the Czechoslovak reserve corps in Ukraine, and besides them some prisoners from Romania also sailed in. The author at the beginning describes the main tendencies in the considerations of transferring soldiers to the Western battlefield in the circles of the foreign resistance. This study is conceived as a probe into the daily life of the military travelers and it provides a sketch of how they messed and spent their free time, how they perceived their departure to France or how they understood the epochal political and social changes taking place around them in revolutionary Russia. For the research, the author predominantly published sources of personal provenance and corresponding specialized literature. This submitted article represents part of the author’s wider professional interests.
Key words: History, Russia, France, Czechoslovak legions, First World War