Historický ústav akademie věd České republiky, v. v. i.

ročník XCIII
č. 2



Plány a možnosti válečné politiky Rakousko-Uherska (listopad 1917 – květen 1918) [Plans and Possibilities of Austro-Hungarian Wartime Policy (November 1917 – May 1918)].
s. 161–175

After the Communist coup in St. Petersburg, the domestic political situation in Russia changed drastically as did international conditions towards the end of the First World War. Like other powers involved in combat, Austria-Hungary immediately began to assess possible options. Its representatives were pushing for a separate peace with revolutionary Russia and they were also secretly negotiating a separate peace with the Entente. Germany, however, was attempting to take advantage of the collapse of the Eastern front to achieve a decisive victory in the West in cooperation with weakened Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary subordinated itself to the great power plans of Germany and this resulted in rising hostility on the part of the Entente towards Austria-Hungary. However, achieving the demands of Berlin and the Grossdeutsche movement in Cisleithania was, from the summer of 1918, ever more dependent on the result of the war, which the Entente seemed poised to win.

Andrej TÓTH
Stanovisko Budapešti v otázce podpisu mírové smlouvy se spojeneckými a přidruženými mocnostmi (květen – červen 1920) [The Position of Budapest on the Issue of signing a Peace Treaty with Allied and Affiliated Powers (May – June 1920)].
s. 177–215

Hungary was invited to the Paris Peace Conference on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Council taken on 1 December 1919. The government of Christian-National prime minister, Károly Huszar, decided definitely to send delegates to the Paris Peace Conference on 29 December 1919. The proposed peace agreement between Allied and affiliated powers, on the one hand, and Hungary, on the other, was received by the Hungarian peace delegation on 15 January 1920. The final version of the Hungarian peace agreement was received nearly four months later on 6 May, respectively 5 May 1920. Budapest was required to inform the Peace Conference as to whether Hungary would sign the treaty or not by 21 May. From the outset, the decision-making process of the Hungarian cabinet as well as the position of the Hungarian peace delegation were controlled by the country’s central political authorities, namely those in charge of formulating foreign policy decisions regarding peace issues. Among these individuals was the foreign minister, Count Teleki, under whose direction secret French-Hungarian negotiations were taking place as well as the head of the Hungarian peace delegation, Apponyi. From the outset, regent Miklós Horthy de Nagybánya was in favor of accepting the peace treaty. The policy of Hungary’s leading politicians emanated from the secret French-Hungarian discussions led by the foreign minister of which most cabinet members remained unaware. Nevertheless, Hungary’s leading politicians were aware that room for changes in the conditions of the peace treaty on the basis of the true state of international political conditions was contingent upon acceptance of the treaty itself. The government was thus aware of the indubitable necessity to sign the treaty despite the stringent conditions it imposed. The key issue in discussions that followed was who would sign the treaty. Would it be Apponyi’s peace delegation or would the peace delegation resign and leave the decision to the government? This was a procedural matter that needed to be decided so that Hungary could reply to the Peace Conference. In the end, the peace delegation did not sign the treaty and the government concurrently expressed its willingness to accept it. This decision was announced on the date by which Hungary was required to reply and not a day earlier as the government had resolved on 18 May.

Peter ŠVÍK
Kodifikácia politickej pamäti na bankovkách vo vybraných postkomunistických krajinách: Česko, Chorvátsko, Maďarsko, Poľsko, Slovensko a Slovinsko [The Codification of Political Memory on the Banknotes of Selected Post-Communist Countries: Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia].
s. 217–239

In the first half of the 1990s the countries addressed in this article underwent the process of transition from Communism to democracy. This development, in addition to deep structural changes in politics and economy, weakened individual and social identifications. An intensive search for alternative identifications, which would enable members of these societies to identify themselves in altered contextual conditions, commenced. Nationalism came to the fore once again. State symbolism reflected this shift as well and a new political memory was finally codified by a change of official state symbols. The iconography of banknotes represents the changing political memory in a most comprehensive way, because, unlike national flags, coats of arms and national anthems, it captures time narration as well. The author attempts to demonstrate different elaborations of the otherwise common motif of nationalism in different national contexts. The author starts off with the assumption that singular realizations may vary, depending on the fact whether the present state is related to historically-dominant statehood or not. Therefore the author observes national variations of the structure of personalities depicted on the banknotes, as well as of the banknotes’ design. His own conceptualization is based on the view of identity developed by Brubaker and Cooper and the iconological method of Panofsky.


Jindřich DEJMEK
Další nepublikovaná část Pamětí Edvarda Beneše z druhé světové války: Podkapitola o „leninismu“ [Another unpublished Section of the Memoirs of Edvard Beneš from the Second World War: A Sub-Chapter on “Leninism”].
s. 241–246

This article provides an impression of a small part of the unpublished volume (written sometime in 1946) of the memoirs of the second president of the Czechoslovak Republic, Edvard Beneš, which was supposed to be included in the second unfinished volume of his memoirs. The existence of the text was unknown until recently because it was misfiled among some papers concerning press matters in the Archive of the Office of the President of the Republic.

In this text, Beneš briefly discussed his interpretation of so-called Leninism as one of a number of paths in the development of European socialist thought. However, he expressly stated that every country would find its own way towards so-called socializing democracy on the basis of its own tradition, level of development, etc. This statement serves to supplement similar thoughts of Beneš expressed in his theoretical works, Democracy: Today and Tomorrow, Reflections on Slavism, and in the relevant section of his memoirs.


Demokracie, diktatury a politické stranictví na Slovensku.
(Michal Kubát)
s. 247–249

Nad knihou o česko-srbských vztazích v meziválečné moderní architektuře.
(Tanja Damljanović: Češko-srpske arhitektonske veze 1918-1941)
(Ondřej Vojtěchovský)
s. 249–254

K poctě bulharského akademika Vasila Gjuzeleva.
(TANGRA. Sbornik v čest na 70-godišninata na akad. Vasil Gjuzelev)
(Lubomíra Havlíková)
s. 255–260

Sěrp i rubl. Konservativnaja moděrnizacija v SSSR.
(Zdeněk Bělonožník)
s. 260–262

Kniha uznání a pokory.
(Je. P. Serapionova: Karel Kramarž i Rossija 1890–1937 gody)
(Vratislav Doubek)
s. 262–264

Active and Cohesive: Tomorrow´s EU Policy towards Belarus.
(Petra Cibulková)
s. 264–266

Demografski problemi procesa izbjeglištva u Republici srpskoj.
(Ondřej Žíla)
s. 266–272


Vojenská témata na akademické půdě [Military Topics at the Campus].
s. 286–287

Mikuláš NEVRLÝ
70 rokov ukrajinského gymnázia v Prešove [The Seventy Years of the Ukrainian Gymnasium in Prešov].
s. 287

Konference v Bratislavě [A Conference in Bratislava].
s. 288


Luboš ŠVEC
Herbert Adolphus Miller, psychóza útisku a středoevropská otázka [Herbert Adolphus Miller, Psychosis of Oppression and Central European Nations].
s. 289–320

This paper discussses the life and scientific work of American sociologist, Herbert Adolphus Miller (1875–1951). H. A. Miller belonged to the Chicago school of sociology (assimilation liberals), which focused its scientific research on problems surrounding the integration of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe. Miller refused top-down methods of Americanization and advocated a liberal approach to integration stressing that Americanization had to mean adoption of American spiritual values spontaneously. In his view, the methods of top-down Americanization promoted by some scholars and politicians could only result in a revival of the psychosis of national oppression to which the immigrants had been subjected in Central and East European monarchies. Before the First World War, he started to study Czech immigrants in Chicago on the advice of his teacher, William I. Thomas, who dealt with the sociological research of Polish immigration. Miller visited Bohemia in 1912. He appreciated the Czech education system, historicism, and free-thinking. He was especially impressed by discussions with Thomas G. Masaryk. Masaryk influenced Miller´s intepretation of national conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe in a decisive way.

During the First World War, Miller gradually shifted his scientific interest from immigration to active support of Masaryk´s action abroad. From the end of 1917, he was engaged in a propagandistic campaign of the Committee on Public Information. His activity culminated after Masaryk´s arrival in the United States. Assuming the establishment of a „bulwark of freedom“ against the Central Powers, he founded the Mid-European Union together with Masaryk. This organization consisted of representatives of oppressed Central and East European nations. He became director and assisted in bringing the American public to legitimacy of Masaryk´s demands on destruction of Austria-Hungaria. Miller organized the advisory committee for the finalization of the declaration of Czechoslovak independence in Washington and later the Philadelphia congress of the Mid-European Union with the Declaration of Common Aims in the spirit of President Wilson´s democratic ideals.

After the war and the short existence of the Mid-European Union, Miller returned to his scientific and university work. At the end of the 1920s, he shifted his scientific interest to the study of the national emancipation process in India, China, and Korea. His sympathy for Indian national emancipation as well as his rejection of segregation in America was the reason for his dismissal from Ohio State University in 1931. He did not get a permanent contract at any American university after his dismissal. During the Second World War, Miller participated in American seminars for refugee scholars and expressed his firm support for Czechoslovakia and democracy once again.