Historický ústav akademie věd České republiky, v. v. i.

roč. 21, 2013, č. 1



Torsten LORENZ
Družstevnictví střední a východní Evropy v procesu utváření národních společností
1850–1940. Pokus o periodizaci
[The cooperatives in Central and Eastern Europe and their role in the formation of national
communities 1850–1940. An attempt of periodization]
s. 1–18

Marek ŠMÍD
Pojetí křesťanského státu v díle Rudolfa Iny Malého a Josefa Konstantina Miklíka
[The concept of Christian state in the work of Rudolf Ina Malý and Josef Konstantin Miklík]
s. 19–37

Postoj carského Ruska k nabídkám separátního míru s císařským Německem
za „Velké války“ (1916–1917)
[Tsarist Russia’s attitude to the proposals of separate peace with the imperial Germany during the “Great War” (1916–1917)]
s. 39–63

Vojtěch RAIMAN
Návrat krále? Restaurační pokusy Karla Habsburského v Maďarsku v roce 1921 ve světle mezinárodních vztahů v Evropě
[Return of the King? The restoration attempts of Charles Habsburg in Hungary in 1921 in the light of international relations in Europe]
s. 65–102

Josef TOMEŠ – Richard VAŠEK
Beneš známý i neznámý. Obraz Edvarda Beneše v memoárech pamětníků
[Beneš known and unknown. The image of Edvard Beneš in the memoirs of his contemporaries]
s. 103–121

Bohuslav LITERA
Soupeření centra a regionů ve stalinském Sovětském svazu od počátku 30. let do konce „velkého teroru“ v roce 1938
[Rivalry between the center and the particular regions in the Stalinist Soviet Union from the early 1930s to the end of the “great terror” in 1938]
s. 123–145

Arizace židovského majetku na Vsetínsku v letech 1939–1945
[Aryanization of Jewish property in the area of Vsetín in 1939–1945]
s. 147–189

Peter ŠVÍK
Ideová a koncepčná východiska zahraničnopolitického programu Rady slobodného Československa (1948–1953)
[The Council of Free Czechoslovakia and the ideological and conceptual foundations of its foreign political program (1948–1953)]
s. 191–206

Jaroslav MILLER
Neznámý příběh českého exilu II: „Československé sdružení v Západní Austrálii“, 1968–1989
[An unknown story of the Czech exile II: “Czechoslovak Association in Western Australia”, 1968–1989]
s. 207–222


Bernadeta OTTMÁROVÁ – Miroslav KMEŤ
Uznesenia vybraných uhorských stolíc vo veci šírenia maďarčiny z 30. rokov 19. storočia v administratíve a súdnictve vs. uhorská spoločnosť
[Decisions of selected Hungarian domains extending the use of Hungarian as a privileged language in administration and justice in the 1830s versus Hungarian society]
s. 223–238

Jindřich DEJMEK
Pamětní spis Jana Pátka o aktivitách čs. velvyslanectví ve Velké Británii v srpnu 1968
[Jan Páteks memorial on the Czechoslovak Embassy in Great Britain and its activities in August 1968]
s. 239–256


Medzinárodná vedecká konferencia Gustáv Husák a jeho doba
[International scientific conference “Gustáv Husák and his time”]
(Ferdinand Vrábel)
s. 257–260


Výzkumy emigrace a exilu ve dvacátém století
Václav VONDRÁŠEK – Jan PEŠEK, Slovenský poválečný exil a jeho aktivity 1945–1970. Mýty a realita, Bratislava, VEDA, vydavatelstvo Slovenskej akadémie vied 2011, 570 s. (+ 163 s. příloh). ISBN 978-80-224-1224-7.
(Jana Burešová)
s. 261–264

Gustav NOVOTNÝ, Jaroslav Bakeš (1871–1930). Lékař, na něhož se zapomnělo, Praha, Historický ústav 2012, 478 s. ISBN 978-80-7286-205-4.
(Josef Harna)
s. 265–267

Pavel CIBULKA, Německé politické strany na Moravě (1890–1918). Ideje – programy – osobnosti, Praha 2012, 447 s. ISBN 978-80-7286-177-4.
(Josef Harna)
s. 267–269


Torsten LORENZ
The cooperatives in Central and Eastern Europe and their role in the formation of national communities 1850–1940. An attempt of periodization

During their less than a hundred-year existence from their emergence to the outbreak of the Second World War the cooperatives experienced a rapid development. From the scattered isolated philanthropic associations of the 1850s and 1860s they evolved into a broad social movement to become an important player in the market.  The cooperative principle was adjusted to different general conditions and needs, and thus a variety of its functions developed. Its success, however, required the basic economic rules to be considered. Where cooperatives ignored them, they failed. The history of modern cooperative movement in Central and Eastern Europe was thus closely connected with that of nationalism. Consequently, most of the first cooperative leaders were leading personalities of the national movement. They viewed cooperatives not only as tools to foster the economic development, but also to develop national emancipation. These members of intelligentsia and bourgeoisie were responsible for the cooperative movement being based on the principles of national separation. While at the initial stage of national movement the economic development was of secondary importance compared to the cultural requirements, the situation changed when cooperatives had become a mass movement. The cooperatives put their communication networks at the disposal of the national movement, or they were established in places where an initial cultural institution was already available. Thus, they constituted a support for national movements and contributed to the struggles shifting from the national area to the economic one. The national role of cooperatives did not change after World War I, and they continued playing a similar important role for the new minorities as they had played for the nationalities without a state of their own. However, the large shift to the authoritarian forms of political administration and to state interventionism, via a stage of mutual symbiosis, finally made the cooperatives subordinated to state control. This evolution anticipated the loss of power and importance of independent cooperatives in socialism.
Keywords: History, 19th and 20th century, Central and Eastern Europe, economy, nationalism, cooperative movement

Marek ŠMÍD
The concept of Christian state in the work of Rudolf Ina Malý and Josef Konstantin Miklík

The paper deals with two outstanding Catholic intellectuals, R.I. Malý and J. K. Miklík, in the period of existence of the First Czechoslovak Republic, analyzing both their critical statements against the existing liberal democratic order, political parties, capitalism and elections, and their political constructs believed to transform or totally change life in the country and make it more efficient. Their political concepts of authoritarian conservative Christian state were supposed to counterbalance the humanitarian type of democracy with a new closed type of society with privileged position of its Catholic part. The wrong timing of their “reform” as well as the religious conditions in the interwar Czechoslovakia proved unacceptable both for their contemporaries in the 1920s and 1930s and for the current representatives of  a “third way” between socialism and capitalism. Still, in spite of their sophisticated concepts, the Catholic camp proved unable to prevent secularization, atheization and liberalization.
Keywords: History, 20th Century, Catholic Church, First Czechoslovak Republic, Catholic intellectuals, R.I. Malý, J.K. Miklík

Tsarist Russia’s attitude to the proposals of separate peace with the imperial Germany during the “Great War” (1916–1917)

To summarize the above topic one can say based on the latest research that the initiative of making separate peace with Russia came primarily from the imperial Germany. On the Russian side it was mostly appreciated by the Germanophilist and conservative monarchist circles of the court “camarilla” in Petersburg who themselves made several attempts of direct negotiations with Berlin. They were primarily interested in creating favorable external conditions needed to suppress the liberal opposition and destroy the growing revolutionary movement inside Russia. Tsar Nicholas II and Tsarina Alexandra Fyodorovna agreed with the court “camarilla” on the necessity to preserve the existing autocratic system and to suppress the liberal opposition. However, on the other hand, they unrealistically insisted on the imperialistic visions of Russia. The main prerequisite of their realization was a military defeat of Germany, which was out of reach of the decadent tsarist regime. And it was the compliance of the above efforts of the sovereign with those of the court “camarilla” to conserve the autocratic, that means monarchic-dictatorial mechanism of government, which was later used in Soviet Russia to blame the tsar and his family for many – often independent – steps taken by the court “camarilla” towards the German enemy. The liberal and nationalist circles, on the contrary, rejected any separate peace treaty with Germany and demanded that the war must continue until victory so as to achieve the imperialistic goals of Russia, particularly in relation to Turkey and Austria-Hungary. Interestingly, it was primarily the liberal opposition that strongly opposed the autocratic system and tried to introduce more democratic methods of government, e.g., by strengthening the competences of the parliament known as the “State Duma”. The socialist movement had always considered the war “imperialist” and wished to make use of the aggravated social and political situation in tsarist Russia and overthrow the tsarist regime and the capitalist system by means of a radical revolution, and thus take over all state power, which eventually happened as the war drew to its close. These developments dramatically changed the internal situation and the international position of Russia, and strongly influenced also the subsequent international situation and events.
Keywords: History of 20th century, First World War, imperial Germany, tsarist Russia, secret diplomacy, separate peace

Vojtěch RAIMAN
Return of the King? The restoration attempts of Charles Habsburg in Hungary in 1921 in the light of international relations in Europe

This essay focuses on the two restoration attempts of Charles Habsburg in Hungary in 1921. Charles never reconciled himself with leaving the Hungarian throne and never abandoned the idea of a return. This work describes the diplomatic reaction on the restoration attempts from three points of view: the Hungarian approach, the Little Entente and the western Allies (Great Britain, France and Italy). The first chapter deals with the situation in Hungary and Europe between the First World War and the first restoration attempt in March and April 1921. In this period Hungary witnessed two revolutions but at last restored the monarchy, which together with strong legitimist movement gave the ex-king hope for success of his attempts. The following chapter describes the first restoration attempt. Charles hoped in support of western Allies, but underestimated the power of the Little Entente. Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania opposed the restoration, because in their point of view it represented a threat for their sovereignty, and launched diplomatic action against Hungary. Although the Allies were indecisive at the beginning, after these actions they assumed a negative position in order to maintain peace in Central Europe. Nor the Hungarian legitimists supported Charles during the first attempt, as they considered the action of the ex-king as too hasty. Czechoslovak foreign ministry Benes used the danger created by Charles’ restoration attempt to make pressure on Romania to join the Little Entente. The last chapter presents the second restoration attempt in October 1921 and the subsequent events. Charles decided to repeat his attempt, even though he had no significant proof that the situation had became more favourable. During his second attempt the ex-king summoned the troops and tried to regain power by force. This action caused even sharper response in the states of the Little Entente (primarily Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia), which mobilized their armies and threatened Hungary with a military intervention. The Allies were alarmed by the action of the Little Entente but at the end supported their demand to dethrone entire Habsburg dynasty from the Hungarian throne. The restoration attempts of Charles Habsburg in Hungary could not be solved as Hungary’s internal problem and became part of international relationships in Europe. In given circumstances they could not have succeeded. Hungary’s neighbouring states stood against, which has become a key factor for the Allies to assume a negative attitude.
Keywords: History, 20th Century, Hungary, Little Entente, Charles I. Habsburg

Josef TOMEŠ – Richard VAŠEK
Beneš known and unknown. The image of Edvard Beneš in the memoirs of his contemporaries

The personality of Edvard Beneš is firmly rooted in Czech national memory. However, his historic role is viewed even in the Czech milieu, not to mention the international reflection, in different, even contradictory ways: the second Czechoslovak president was in his lifetime, and even more after his death both adored and criticized, praised and damned, but he was naturally also viewed matter-of-factly and critically, including both the positive and the negative aspects of his work and his decisions. Beneš’s appraisal is complicated by the fact that he is closely connected with two fatal disastrous events in our modern history whose protagonist he was, namely the Munich crisis of 1938 and the February coup of 1948, and including the decisions taken by him in the two dilemmas.
The present study focuses on the image of Edvard Beneš available in some less known or even unknown memoirs, mostly unpublished, namely those of Josef David, Aša Jínová, or Jan Jína, Vlastimil Klíma, František Ježek, Vratislav Trčka, Jan Kapras Junior, and Karel Lőbl. Each of them shows Beneš from a different historical, personal and generation-dependent point of view and emphasizes different political and personal features, the entirety of which reveals the following characteristics:
Edvard Beneš was considered a highly competent and very hard working politician and diplomat who saw politics as his only true life’s task and mission. In spite of publicly sharing the humanitarian principles of Masarykian democracy he proved rather pragmatic in practical politics and quite frequently did not hesitate to apply the Machiavellian methods. It has been repeatedly stressed that being a highly authoritarian person he was unable to set up a good working-team: he preferred to make decisions and carry them out himself, did not tolerate different opinions and their carriers, ignored the suggestions of his advisors, and was mostly surrounded by people who were only carrying out his decisions. He had no feeling for the personal and characteristic qualities of his collaborators, and in general he exhibited an impersonal, insensitive attitude to other people, whom he viewed as chess-men in a political chess-game. He failed to master the art of rhetoric, highly appreciated at the time, but he excelled in debates. He had perfectly mastered the art of political tactics and compromise, but he was unable to manage the two major conflicts and crises, where he was the eventual loser. Still, however, he accepted his responsibility for the fatal decisions that determined the future of Czechoslovakia for decades.
History, 20th Century, Czechoslovakia, Edvard Beneš, Munich 1938, February 1938, memoirs

Bohuslav LITERA
Rivalry between the center and the particular regions in the Stalinist Soviet Union from the early 1930s to the end of the “great terror” in 1938

The history of relations between the center and the particular regions during one of the vital periods following the first Five-Year-Plan (1932) until the end of the “great terror” late in 1938 is discussed. A period of relative “détente” started after the completion of the centralization process, which eventually proved less successful than Moscow had hoped and which accompanied the beginning of accelerated modernization within the Five-Year Plan. The effects of this trend are demonstrated by means of a number of examples, including the quotas in and the general orientation of the next five-year period. These data demonstrate the state of centralization and the mechanisms used by Moscow to control the regional officials are explained. When analyzing the proceedings of the XVII Bolshevist Party Congress held in 1934, which formally closed the biggest chaos of preceding forced collectivization in agriculture and started the process of industrialization, the author explains the position and work of Sergey M. Kirov in the top Party organs. He critically analyzes the theory of Kirov’s being a potential rival to J. V. Stalin and of his murder, which is considered by some researchers as the beginning of a wave of terror. It is emphasized that in spite of the centralization efforts the local officials could develop a number of strategies to resist the pressure from Moscow. Some indices suggest that the efforts aimed at totally controlling the regions and liquidating the existing Party and local government officials constituted one of the reasons to launch the “great terror” of 1937–1938. In the atmosphere of terror the regional officials became themselves both very active executors of the terror and its victims as well. They were replaced by a young generation of officials fully dependent on Stalin. An important feature of the further existence of the Soviet Union was the fact that terror constituted for Stalin and the center one of the main tools of controlling the state and society.
Keywords: History, 20th Century, Soviet Union, Stalinism

Aryanization of Jewish property in the area of Vsetín in 1939–1945

Aryanization started in Germany in the years 1933–1938. After the Munich Agreement, the process continued in the former Czechoslovak regions with German population known as Sudetenland that had been attached to Germany. With the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia the Aryanization concept was officially introduced in the Bohemian Lands, although some claims concerning the Jewish property had already been raised during the Second Republic (1938–1939). The Aryanization of minor Jewish property, such as trades and small businesses, was carried out by the Oberlandrat Offices as lower administration bodies of the occupation authorities. It was legislatively based primarily on the decree of Reichsprotektor K. von Neurath of 21 June 1939 and on the subsequent implementation instructions. The Protectorate authorities, too, were involved in the Aryanization process, particularly through the Government Decree No. 87 of 21 March 1939 and some other normative acts. The course of Aryanization in the regional context depended on the specific structure of Jewish business activities here prior to 1939, with some partial modifications, mainly in the entrepreneurial sector. A typical feature of the Jewish trades was their traditional small size. The Aryanization itself started immediately after the country’s occupation on 15 March 1939 with the local Protectorate authorities trying to draw up a list of Jewish land property, trades and businesses. Actually, Aryanization started in the region with the exclusion of Jews from the local economic corporations as early as April 1939. Simultaneously, attempts were made by the municipal self-government corporations to directly aryanize the land property of the Jewish Religious Association in Vsetín. Studies of historical sources have also confirmed that participants of the Aryanization process were not only the acquirers or occupation authorities, but also the “competent” Protectorate authorities and economic corporations.
Keywords: History, 20th century, Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Nazi policy, Jews, Aryanization, Vsetín area

Peter ŠVÍK
The Council of Free Czechoslovakia and the ideological and conceptual foundations of its foreign political program (1948–1953)

The history of the so-called Third Czechoslovak resistance and particularly that of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia has already been a subject of relative intense research in Czech and Slovak historiography. Yet, one can still pose some questions which were not addressed in-depth heretofore. One of these is the question of whether some of the Czechoslovak exiles attended the Congress of Europe held in The Hague in May 1948 or not. According to the official list of participants, ten persons from among the Czechoslovak exiles participated to the event. Was this possible, however, in the light of extremely complicated situation many emigrants faced in the uneasy post-war years? And, in the context of development The Hague Congress foreshadowed, one may ask what attitudes the Czechoslovak exile movement took towards the European questions. Hence, lastly, what objectives did the Council’s European program seek in the first half of the 1950s? Due to the unclear competence structure, program contradictions mainly in ethnic items, and preference of particular personal or small-group interests the first comprehensive program of the Council was not adopted until 4 January 1951. The document, entitled “Main principles of policy for the Council of Free Czechoslovakia in the fight against Communism and Soviet imperialism”, was worked out by H. Ripka and “two main theses” of the Council’s foreign policy were defined there: “The goal of the first one was to restore a sovereign Czechoslovakia that would act independently in European politics, and the ultimate goal of a united democratic Europe was declared. The second thesis aimed at organizing the world on the basis of an international legal order that would be binding for everybody”. Paradoxically, this program was one of the few matters the exiles were able to agree on in January 1951. Two days later, the Executive Committee started discussing other questions of organizational, personal and programmatic nature; however, the impossibility to achieve a compromise between the opinions of two opposed groups (the first one represented by Lettrich and Osuský, the other by Zenkl and Papánek) culminated on 21 January 1951 with the Zenkl group leaving the Executive Committee and setting up a competing body, the National Committee of Free Czechoslovakia, ten days later.
Keywords: History, 20th century, Cold War, Czechoslovakia, anti-Communist resistance movement, Council of Free Czechoslovakia

Jaroslav MILLER
An unknown story of the Czech exile II: “Czechoslovak Association in Western Australia”, 1968–1989

The events taking place in Communist Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the subsequent period of “normalization” produced a wave of mass emigration heading, like the previous one after February 1948, to West European countries and the United States. One of the main destinations of the post-August emigration was also Australia and Oceania; however, the exile activities of Czechs and Slovaks in that region have been paid very little systematic attention so far. An analysis of the Czech exile in Western Australia after 1968 reveals a number of features of general nature. The split between the fractions of exile organization in Western Australia, which was partly due to the tension between the post-February and the post-August emigration groups, could be observed in different forms almost in all Australian exile centers, and several years were needed in some cases to stabilize the situation. For instance, the Chronicle of the Czechoslovak Club in Southern Australia in Adelaide, which is a source of rather panegyric nature, says that “old-settlers viewed the newcomers as Communism-infected people while the post-August immigrants accused the old-settlers of being old-fashioned, petrified in the year 1948.” In the course of the 1970s and 1980s, the political activities and radical anti-Communist attitudes declined in all Australian exile centers being mostly replaced by those in the field of culture and arts. At that time a number of Czech artists could make a career in Australia and regular Czech broadcast started in all major cities. Of key importance were the branches of the Society of Science and Arts in Perth, Sydney and Melbourne whose work counterbalanced to some extent that of the initially political exile organizations.
Keywords: History, 20th century, exile, Western Australia, post-August emigration

Bernadeta OTTMÁROVÁ – Miroslav KMEŤ
Decisions of selected Hungarian domains extending the use of Hungarian as a privileged language in administration and justice in the 1830s versus Hungarian society

A reform movement came to the fore in Hungary’s politics in the early 1830s that was aimed at a reform of economy and continued the efforts of the Hungarian Estates from the 1790s. Part of the considerations on a modernization of Hungary was also the question of broader use of the Hungarian language. The Hungarian Diet introduced between 1825 and 1827 a new element in its debates, namely an extended use of the Hungarian language in administration and justice, which was believed to eliminate the alleged Russian danger. This was undoubtedly due to the development of local activities of the Slav nations in Hungary. In autumn 1830, the Diet passed the law stipulating that any office in Hungary must only be held by persons speaking Hungarian. The radicalization of patriotism among the local aristocracy was due to the events taking place in Poland, the resistance to Russia-supported Vienna, and other reports on the revolutionary wave in Europe. In 1832–1836, the Diet extended the use of Hungarian in justice, administration, education, and church. Interestingly, the first domains to take initiative in applying the program fostering the Hungarian language were those in Upper Hungary with absolute majority of Slovakian population. The domains mostly complied with the 1830 law and with the subsequent instructions on the use of Hungarian. However, the representatives of some domains went beyond the stipulations of the law and did not hesitate to apply strong restrictions, and even included some excesses in their regulations. However, the legislative magyarization fever of some domain representatives often failed to achieve its goals in the everyday life of the population. The enormous variety of regulations at the domain level declined in the early 1840s due to some exhaustion of the problem, resistance of non-Hungarian scholars, dissatisfaction of a great part of the public, Vienna’s dissatisfaction, and also to some new legal regulations at the provincial level (Diet sessions of 1839/1840 and 1843/1844).
Keywords: History, 19th century, Hungary, Slovakia, nationalism

Jindřich DEJMEK
Jan Páteks memorial on the Czechoslovak Embassy  in Great Britain and its activities in August 1968

The paper contains a critical publication of the memorial of Jan Pátek (1909–2004), Czechoslovak Embassy Counselor in Great Britain, concerning Britain’s attitude to the Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, and the atmosphere in the Embassy at that time. Pátek, who was a qualified businessman, entered diplomacy in 1948 and was appointed legacy counselor at the Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington and then headed for some time the Foreign Office American and British Department. In 1951, however, he was fired due to his relationship to V. Clementis. After his rehabilitation in 1963 he was allowed to reenter the diplomatic service and was appointed Czechoslovak Deputy Ambassador to Great Britain. He served in that position until early 1970. In that position he also contributed to some activation of the relations between the two countries in the latter half of the 1960s. He was present in the British capital, and even headed the Czechoslovak Embassy while Ambassador M. Růžek was on vacation when his country was occupied on 21 August 1968. Although he followed the instructions coming from Prague and endeavored to help Czechoslovak citizens in Great Britain in their often difficult situation, he was criticized by the pro-Soviet elements in the Foreign Office and in spite of his loyalty he was forced to quit again the diplomatic service with the beginning of what is known as “normalization process”. Nevertheless, his memorial is an important document of the attitude of the Labour Government headed by Harold Wilson to the Czechoslovak question in 1968 and of the practice of Czechoslovak diplomacy at that time.
Keywords: History, 20th Century, Czechoslovak foreign policy in 1968, August 1968, Soviet invasion in 1968, attitude of the West to the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968