Historický ústav akademie věd České republiky, v. v. i.

č. 15/2007



Lidové obrození a lidoví buditelé. Se zřetelem na sociální stratifikaci lidového národního hnutí 1800–1850
[National revival and revivalists. Social stratification of the national revival movement 1800–1850]
s. 5

Parlament und Organisation des Reichsgerichts der Österreichischen Monarchie
[Parliament and the Imperial Court organization in the Austrian Monarchy]
s. 61

Integrálně nacionální koncepce Československé národní demokracie po vzniku ČSR
[Integral nationalist concepts of the Czechoslovak National Democracy after the creation of Czechoslovakia]
s. 101

Publicista a spisovatel Karel Horký a jeho týdeník Fronta (Příspěvek k obrazu české protihradní opozice mezi světovými válkami)
[Journalist and writer Karel Horký and his weekly Fronta. (A contribution to the research into the so-called „Anti-Castle opposition“ between the two world wars)]
s. 133

Československá diplomacie a řecko-turecká válka 1920–1922
[Czechoslovak diplomacy and the Greek-Turkish War 1920–1922]
s. 183

Poláci a Čechoslováci jako členové mezinárodní historické komunity v letech 1918–1938
[The Poles and the Czechs as members of international historical community, 1918–1938]
s. 221

Na cestě ke konfliktu – kontakty československé exilové vlády s Polským výborem národního osvobození a polskou prozatímní vládou
[Heading towards a conflict – contacts of the Czechoslovak Exile Government with the Polish National Liberation Committee and the Polish Provisional Government]
s. 239

Sovětizace jako výkladový problém
[Sovietization as a problem of interpretation]
s. 287

Stalinismus a destalinizace (Bulharsko, Rumunsko a Albánie v padesátých letech)
[Stalinism and destalinization (Bulgaria, Rumania and Albania
in the 1950s)]
s. 303

Bohuslav LITERA
K vývoji sovětského bloku ve druhé polovině 60. let
[Evolution of the Soviet bloc in the late 1960s]
s. 329


National revival and revivalists. Social stratification of the national revival movement 1800–1850

During the first half of the 19th century the existing social structures were incessantly disintegrating and at the same time new structures were appearing. This process is in Czech historiography commonly known as the „National Revival“. Historians have viewed this historical period from different viewpoints that were strongly influenced by the contemporary methodological and even ideological positions. In particular, they searched for the main National Revival carrier and concentrated on the period of „1848–1848 Revolution“. However, they often failed to pay sufficient attention to the preceding „pre-March period“, which distorted their view of that historical phenomenon. Actually, the National Revival was a very complex and structured process that was due, in addition to the objective historical trends, also to heterogeneous social components of the changing Czech society (townsmen, petty bourgeoisie and rural population, wage laborers, craftsmen, farmers, businessmen, clerks, artists, intelligentsia, priests, emerging industrial and financial bourgeoisie, etc.) Each social element made a specific contribution to the National Revival process, which must be studied in its entirety.

Parliament and the Imperial Court organization in the Austrian Monarchy

Constitutional review as an institution of modern democratic system - like nowadays in Austria – has the duty to guarantee the written constitution on the basis of republic principles. But in the essence it roots in the tradition of the constitutional monarchy. In December 1867 on initiative of the House of Representatives an Imperial Court of Justice was set-up mainly serving to check constitutional standards. Because of this significant political character it was kept in specific relations to executive power and parliament: The Imperial Court of Justice consisted of a president and his deputy as well as twelve full and four substitute members. They all were appointed for lifetime by the emperor, but the latter only on the basis of proposals offered by the Imperial Council: Within the space of its existence 82 persons became appointed for vacancies at the Imperial Court. The personal composition of the Imperial Court in a striking way did also reflect those elements of character, which its creators wanted him to dedicate. Its members mainly were kept in manifold functions to judiciary praxis and science; but activities at the Imperial Court in principle also were compatible with political offices. Most evitable got such connections with the political world in regard of parliamentary representations.

Integral nationalist concepts of the Czechoslovak National Democracy after the creation of Czechoslovakia

With the creation of an independent Czechoslovakia, the main goal of the precoup political program of Czech rightist parties was achieved, i.e., creation of an independent national state restoring the tradition of medieval Czech statehood. The Czechoslovak Republic was based on the principles of pluralistic democratic society as formulated in the Washington Declaration. As a result, the main idea of its modern oriented founders was in contradiction to the conservative traditionalistic concept of Czech integral nationalism that entirely rejected the Declaration’s principles of postwar open democracy. 
Based on an analysis of particular features and attributes of the ideology of integral nationalism strong efforts of national-democratic integral nationalists can be identified that were aimed at imposing restrictions on the system of representative democracy with its general, equal and direct right to vote. The Czechoslovak National Democracy opposed the model of liberal parliament-based democracy, but preferred conservative authoritarian values.

Journalist and writer Karel Horký and his weekly Fronta. (A contribution to the research into the so-called “Anti-Castle opposition“ between the two world wars)

The study goes into the history of the political weekly Fronta appearing in Prague from 1927 to 1939, where a number of remarkable rightist personalities opposing the Castle (i.e., the President’s policy) published their views. The study focuses on the life of the weekly’s editor K. Horký. The roots of Horký’s „anti-Castle“ positions are traced back to the period of World War I when Horký failed to fully engage in the anti-Hapsburg resistance movement led by Masaryk. The bitter feelings together with the scandal of his father-in-law J. Dürich made him furiously attack E. Beneš and later also T. G. Masaryk. As a result, his position in the resistance movement became difficult and he started sympathizing with Bolshevism.
In 1927, together with the nationalists V. Dyk and L. Borský and with the agrarian financial support, he established Fronta. This change from left to right is viewed by the author as being a result of Horký’s search for fellow fighters against the Castle. In the beginning, Fronta disputed particularly the Liberator Legend and Beneš’s foreign policy, and struggled for a strong national state.
In spite of its proclaimed independence the weekly did not conceal its sympathy with the Agrarian Party, and as of 1929 also with the League Against Block Ballots, which was the reason why V. Dyk and L. Borský left the periodical. In spite of the fact that Fronta‘s contributors were, among others, extreme right-wingers, the journal’s orientation was not so extreme as to be considered extremist or Nazi.
Fronta’s orientation dramatically changed in the mid-1930s. With its new attitude to the Castle the periodical approached the political center. After E. Beneš’s inauguration to the President’s Office, the weekly started supporting him, without indicating acceptable reasons of that change. The author believes that the real reason was the increasing interior and exterior threat to the country, of which Fronta was well aware. In 1937, Horký even openly admitted that his attacks twenty years before had been wrong.
The author appreciates Horký’s highly moral positions after the Munich Agreement when he categorically refused to join in Fronta the witch-hunt launched by the right extremists. Shortly after the country’s occupation, Fronta ceased to appear. Horký refused to retake his anti-Beneš positions and retired from public life. After February 1948, the possibility to publish his views was strongly limited.

Czechoslovak diplomacy and the Greek-Turkish War 1920–1922

The attempt to implement the Sèvres Peace Treaty, which ultimately led to a war between Greece and Turkey, had also its consequences for the remote Czechoslovak Republic. Czechoslovakia as a signatory to the Treaty was naturally interested in its implementation. Therefore, the resistance of the Turkish nationalists (known as Kemalists) was an undesired complication. As a result, Czechoslovakia showed sympathy with Greek’s intervention in Minor Asia. However, the attitude to Greece soon changed, as did the political evolution in that country. Sympathy was replaced by reservation, dictated not only by the policy of the Great Powers, but also by the policy of Czechoslovakia’s most important Balkan ally, the King¬dom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. At a later stage of the war, Czechoslovak diplomacy faced the Greek government’s efforts of rapprochement with the Little Entente countries hoping to break its isolation and obtain support for its efforts. Of course, Czechoslovakia showed no interest in such rapprochement, as this would divert the Little Entente’s focus from Central Europe, which was the main area of interest of the Czechoslovak government. By no means, however, the reserved attitude to Greece can be regarded as a sign of sympathy to the other belligerent party. Although Czechoslovakia’s diplomacy allowed the Kemalists to purchase military material in Czechoslovak munition-works, and as the Greek military campaign more and more failed, Czechoslovakia consented to a revision of the Sèvres Peace Treaty and politically opposed the Kemalists much more than the position of Gree¬ce.

The Poles and the Czechs as members of international historical community, 1918–1938

This article deals with some aspects of participation of Polish and Czechoslovak historians at international historical cooperation. The author follows domestic conditions in Poland and Czechoslovakia leading to international presentation of outcomes of historical sciences in given countries. It was essential to create whole-nation organization responsible for communication with international historical community as well as to articulate goals towards foreign historiographies. Polish historians worked out united historical society (Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne, est. 1924) much sooner than their Czechoslovak colleagues and they launched regular national congresses from 1925 where they reflected current trend in historiography. Clearer and more intensive representation of Polish historical sciences is the outcome of more effective organization. Well organized delegations at international congresses and especially organization of Warsaw congress in 1933 may serve as examples. Nevertheless, Polish historians were also eager to broaden international interest in Eastern European history and bilateral scientific dialogue with neighbouring countries. Czechoslovak historiography achieved certain respect in abroad mainly due to individual effort which was bridging the gap created by absence of national committee. This established certain appreciation of historical community for this individual effort but did not use all potential inherent in the Czech historical community. Both Polish and Czechoslovak endeavors to incorporate historical sciences into global community failed in the end of 1930s with the coming of the Second World War.

Heading towards a conflict – contacts of the Czechoslovak Exile Government with the Polish National Liberation Committee and the Polish Provisional Government

Already before the interruption of diplomatic contacts between the Soviet Union and the Polish Exile Government in April 1943 foundations of a future Polish pro-Soviet government were laid. In May 1943, the Polish Tadeusz Kościuszko Division was formed under the Soviet patronage, and also a Union of Polish Patriots was established in the Soviet Union to represent the pro-Soviet Poles, which in fact was a tool in the Communist hands. Logically, the Czechoslovak representatives in Moscow came more and more frequently into contact with representatives of the Polish Communists and pro-Soviet oriented Poles. In addition, it became soon clear that the Polish Exile Government was getting in increasing isolation and that a new partner of Czechoslovakia would be the Polish government created under the Soviet patronage. Polish Communists, however, had to reckon with a resistance of the Polish population, which was mostly reluctant to accept the Communist ideas. Therefore, they adopted a program aimed at creating a Poland embracing in its territory all the Polish population. That is also why the new Polish government wanted to get back the Těšín area with mostly Polish population, and refused to unequivocally recognize the prewar borders of Czechoslovakia in that area. This, however, was a condition required by the Czechoslovak government to establish diplomatic contacts with the Polish Provisional Government in Warsaw. Based on many domestic and foreign sources unknown up to now the contacts between the Czechoslovak exile government and the Polish National Liberation Committee are analyzed by the author and a number of new facts are shown in relation to the diplomatic background of the recognition of the Polish Provisional Government by Czechoslovakia. The roots of the territorial conflict that broke out between Poland and Czechoslovakia soon after the end of World War II are explained.

Sovietization as a Problem of Interpretation

 The paper focuses on interpretation of Sovietization as a matter of geography, chronology, and a political process. As a consequence of the Cold War period the interpretations of Sovietization, being under the strong impact of manichean conceptions of the postwar development as well as of the propaganda schemes, have focused either on internal transformation or on the Soviet expansionism following the turn at the Eastern front in 1943. The paper tries to define fundamental features of Sovietization in terms of a comparative framework manifesting the affinities and differences of political and socio-economic processes taking place in both, Western and East Central Europe as well. The main goal is to grasp Sovietization as a process which can be understood within the context of other historical trends emerging in modern European history and not only as a part of exclusively post-war development.

Stalinism and destalinization (Bulgaria, Rumania and Albania in the 1950s)

In the latter half of the 1940s, processes generally known as „Sovietization“ took place in Bulgaria, Rumania and Albania. This meant a total submission of these countries to Moscow when J. V. Stalin came to the conclusion that it was necessary to „strengthen the unity of the emerging international socialist camp“. The ruling Communists in the countries of so-called „people’s democracy“ were not allowed any more to develop any model of organization and control of society differing from the Soviet one. The Cold War required total obedience in the Soviet block that was not supposed to be weakened by heresy any more (as in J.B.Tito’s case).  Stalin’s death in March 1953, however, and the following search for a „new course“, accompanied by destalinization, caused another slow erosion of the Soviet Empire. The first country to get partly rid of its dependence was Rumania, for the sake of a sort of „liberalism“, followed by Albania, for the sake of dogmatism. Only Bulgaria, where Todor Zhivkov’s regime became established for several decades, remained an absolutely loyal and never arguing ally of the Soviet Union in Southeast Europe.

Bohuslav LITERA
Evolution of the Soviet bloc in the late 1960s

The study deals with the evolution of the Soviet bloc during one of the key periods of its existence, namely from Khrushchev’s overthrow and Brezhnev’s and Kosygin’s taking over the top positions in the Soviet Union to the 1968 suppression of the Prague Spring. The new Soviet leaders tried to increase the „unity“ of the bloc member countries, including transnational organizations, but their proposals made early in 1966 failed. The author has paid much attention to an analysis of the evolution of the Soviet leaders‘ attitudes to the reformist Czechoslovakia in 1968. Their reaction to the particular evolution stages of Czechoslovak reforms and their rapidly changing positions, from restrained support for A. Dubček, through strong criticism of the developments in Czechoslovakia and application of pressure tactics to the final decision to crush the Czechoslovak experiment with military power. The preparation and motives of the Soviet intervention and its short-term as well as longterm consequences are analyzed. The intervention made it possible for Moscow to start reintegrating its bloc in the following year, which now faced only little resistance on the part of its allies (Rumania). An important tool in Moscow’s hands became the newly formulated and publicly proclaimed Brezhnev Doctrine, which was used by the USSR to justify its intervention in Czechoslovakia, but was primarily intended for the 1970s.